ΣΧΟΛΙΟ ΙΣΤΟΛΟΓΙΟΥ : Σιγά σιγά η Δύση αρχίζει να ξυπνάει από τον επιμενίδειο ύπνο της σε ότι αφορά την Τουρκία.
It’s a trick for which the State Department constantly falls:
Adversaries feign grievance in order to win concessions. It is also a
strategy Turkey has mastered. Rather than be held to account for its
support for al Qaeda affiliates in Syria, for turning a blind eye to the
flow of foreign fighters across its border, and for President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan’s own family profiting off
the Islamic State oil trade, U.S. diplomats have treated with
credulousness supposed Turkish fears about Kurdish terrorism originating
in Syria, never mind that Turkish authorities have been unable to present any intelligence showing Kurdish terrorism originating from the Kurdish-controlled Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.
Nevertheless,
U.S. Special Envoy James Jeffrey and his team have acquiesced to
Turkish bluster and have agreed, at least preliminarily, to a Turkish
demand for a buffer zone, although
the details remain unclear. The Kurds, who currently oversee Syria’s
most peaceful and secure region, are loath to trust American
interlocutors when they say that Turkish forces entering their region
will abide by carefully negotiated redlines. First, there is the
precedent of Afrin, a district in Syria that the Turkish Army entered
and proceeded to ethnically cleanse, even bulldozing cemeteries, knocking down statues, and insisting that women veil and utilize Arabic names.
Such activities have been the rule rather than the exception for years. Two and a half years after diplomats hashed out an agreement to end the Turkish military occupation of Bashiqa, in northern Iraq, Turkish forces remain. Years before, a Turkish-led “Peace Monitoring Force”
occupied key posts in Iraqi Kurdistan long after all parties to the
conflict precipitating the intervention made peace and asked the Turks
to depart.
The
problem is not simply Turkey, its leadership’s racism toward Kurdish
cultural expression and antipathy toward Kurdish political aspirations,
or Erdoğan’s imperial impulse. Rather, it’s the Turkish way of diplomacy
itself.
Consider
Turkish efforts to mediate the Somalia dispute. In 1991, the former
British Somaliland withdrew from its union with Somalia and reasserted
its independence, a move the Somali government in Mogadishu does not
recognize. Mogadishu has become, in recent years, a Turkish client if
not colony, but Turkey maintains a consulate in the Somaliland capital
of Hargeisa and has taken itself to mediate the intra-Somali dispute.
Accepting
Turkish mediation, however, has been a mistake because of Ankara’s
repeated bad faith. Somaliland’s borders, for example, were a product of
the late 19th century as British diplomats struck a series of treaties
with local clan leaders, ultimately forming a protectorate. In 1960,
when the United Kingdom offered British Somaliland its full
independence, it and all other permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council recognized its existing borders.
The
Somali state of Puntland, however, formed only in 1998 has disputed
Somaliland’s border. Much of their grievance is contrived, a way in
which Somalia (ironically funded by Western donors) can try to undermine
Somaliland, both for revanchist reasons and to distract from Somalia’s
own corruption and state failure.
Last
February, however, as Turkish diplomats pretended to mediate between
Mogadishu and Hargeisa, Turkey distributed aid into portions of
Somaliland claimed by Somalia, stamped with both the Turkish flag and
that of Somalia (rather than Somaliland), thereby signaling to the local
population both support for the Somalia-sponsored insurgency and
linking aid and assistance to undermining Somaliland. Turkey’s problem,
it seems, is that while Somalia accepts Turkey’s desire for bolstering
religious extremism, Somaliland remains largely moderate and pro-Western
in its outlook. This is the main reason why Somaliland today seeks
broader mediation involving the United States, Great Britain, and a
number of European and African partners, rather than sole reliance on
Turkey.
Then,
there is the issue of overflights. Passengers on international flights
seldom think about the logistics necessary to fly over other countries.
When aircraft enter another country’s airspace, there are both payments
due and coordination necessary with regard to air traffic control. State
recognition is not a predicate for overflight agreements. When I first
visited Kabul in March 2000 at a time when the Taliban controlled the
capital but were unrecognized, for example, I met officials from the
International Air Transport Association who were engaging with the
Taliban about overflights, communications, and emergency procedures.
Turkish
diplomats likewise have mediated between Mogadishu and Hargeisa on
overflights of Somaliland, an increasingly important topic given how
major commercial carriers from Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Djibouti utilize the Hargeisa airport. Despite the agreements which
Turkey brokered between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the Somali government in
Mogadishu unilaterally abrogated its arrangements and
claimed full authority over Somaliland airspace and in Somaliland
facilities. When Somaliland officials complained to Turkey, the Turkish
foreign ministry changed its position and said they were merely
facilitators rather than guarantors.
In
other words, Turkey refused to abide by agreements its own diplomat had
negotiated. Such dishonesty has real world ramifications. According to
one senior Somaliland official, there have been a proliferation of
small, unknown aircraft now traversing Somaliland skies and landing at
small strips suspected of ferrying weaponry to extremists to which Erdoğan is sympathetic.
The
Trump administration may want to believe Turkey’s complaints are
legitimate and that they should open a diplomatic door for a greater
Turkish presence in northern Syria. Special Envoy James Jeffrey may
honestly believe that Turkey will abide by diplomatic commitments he
negotiates. But, Turkey’s recent practice in Syria, Iraq, and Somalia
suggests the opposite: Ankara has no intention to abide by its
agreements, and any commitment to leave Kurdish self-governance alone,
refrain from ethnic cleansing, or to prevent the infiltration of
Islamist extremists and foreign fighters are without meaning. Any broad
understanding of Turkish diplomatic practice today suggests that a U.S.
agreement to a so-called safe-haven is to greenlight a permanent Turkish
occupation and ethnic and sectarian cleansing among the region’s
Kurdish, Yezidi, and Christian populations. It is not only immoral from a
humanitarian view point, but it is also bad policy from a security
standpoint as its undercuts stability and moderation and instead sows
the seeds of radicalism and terror.
Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971)
is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential
blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a
former Pentagon official.
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